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GTI Asseses World Bank Openness in a Transparency Scorecard
A new Transparency Scorecard, published on January 7, 2007, assesses World Bank Openness and evaluates recent changes and advances in transparency policies at the international financial institutions.
The Transparency Scorecard utilizes the standards set out in the recently launched GTI Charter to investigate the overall “openness” the World Bank Group, or the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). While the scorecard acknowledges how far the Bank Group has come over the past 15 years, it examines the remaining gaps and persistent problems that exist between the institutions policy and the international transparency and accountability standards.
The Charter outlines nine transparency principles. Each principle is founded on the basic right of individuals and groups to request and
access information from all public bodies. Furthermore, the Charter and the Scorecard present the access and circulation of information as the responsibility of the international financial institutions (IFIs) to uphold.
The Scorecard examined the disclosure standards of the Bank Group against the criteria laid out in the Charter. First, it examines the
types of information the WBG makes publicly available and whether or not this information provides access to decision-making mechanisms. In this vein, essential criteria such as giving advance notice, disclosing draft information, and opening meetings to the public have been
evaluated to ensure that the intended beneficiaries of development funds can influence how funds are used and then monitor whether these
funds are meeting development objectives.
It was found that while the WBG allows for the routine disclosure of a number of documents and basic information about each branch of the
institution – a notable exception is the lack of public access to WBG contact information -- access to budgetary information at IFC and MIGA
is missing. Most World Bank and IFC institutional policies, strategies and guidelines can be found on their websites. Less information is
available about the institutions’ operations at the country and investment level. Generally, there is limited information disclosed
regarding projects under implementation at the Bank, IFC and MIGA and some upstream country analyses conducted by the World Bank are kept confidential.
Second, the Scorecard examines the WBG’s disclosure systems in order to determine whether the systems (a) uphold the presumption of information disclosure; (b) establish process guarantees for information requests; and (c) allow for an appeals process in the case of requests that have been unreasonably denied.
For example, the Scorecard found, while the policies of the Bank, IFC and MIGA each state a presumption in favor of disclosure, typically
known as a principle of maximum disclosure, this principle is not implemented in practice. Instead, the policies are, in effect, publication schemes which provide a list of information that will be disclosed, while all other information is kept confidential. In this way, the scope of the disclosure policies is limited.
Finally, the Scorecard considers how the right to information is being protected, by evaluating the rules for protecting whistleblowers, the
requirements for regular review of transparency standards, and the procedures in place for the active promotion of openness– through
corporate incentive programs along with dissemination and translation strategies. Although the Bank Group has some positive features of its
whistleblower policy including appropriate burden of proof standards and relief for whistleblowers, there are still several important shortcomings. For instance, the scope of the policy is limited to staff (the WBG’s numerous consultants are not covered); there is no truly
independent forum for adjudication; and there is no record of the institution’s actions to correct and prevent future wrongdoings exposed
through whistleblower disclosure.
Also, it is not clear if and when the WBG conducts staff trainings on the disclosure policy and there is no information on how proper
implementation of openness principles and rules form part of the staff incentive or evaluation procedures. Furthermore, it is unclear whether
sanctions exist for the purposeful violation of the disclosure policy. Finally, while a records management system exist at each arm of the
WBG, only the IFC has clearly indicated that it will track and report on the disclosure of and requests for information.
DETAILS
Published 7th January 2007 by Bank Information Center
A new Transparency Scorecard, published on January 7, 2007, assesses World Bank Openness and evaluates recent changes and advances in transparency policies at the international financial institutions.
The Transparency Scorecard utilizes the standards set out in the recently launched GTI Charter to investigate the overall “openness” the World Bank Group, or the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). While the scorecard acknowledges how far the Bank Group has come over the past 15 years, it examines the remaining gaps and persistent problems that exist between the institutions policy and the international transparency and accountability standards.
The Charter outlines nine transparency principles. Each principle is founded on the basic right of individuals and groups to request and
access information from all public bodies. Furthermore, the Charter and the Scorecard present the access and circulation of information as the responsibility of the international financial institutions (IFIs) to uphold.
The Scorecard examined the disclosure standards of the Bank Group against the criteria laid out in the Charter. First, it examines the
types of information the WBG makes publicly available and whether or not this information provides access to decision-making mechanisms. In this vein, essential criteria such as giving advance notice, disclosing draft information, and opening meetings to the public have been
evaluated to ensure that the intended beneficiaries of development funds can influence how funds are used and then monitor whether these
funds are meeting development objectives.
It was found that while the WBG allows for the routine disclosure of a number of documents and basic information about each branch of the
institution – a notable exception is the lack of public access to WBG contact information -- access to budgetary information at IFC and MIGA
is missing. Most World Bank and IFC institutional policies, strategies and guidelines can be found on their websites. Less information is
available about the institutions’ operations at the country and investment level. Generally, there is limited information disclosed
regarding projects under implementation at the Bank, IFC and MIGA and some upstream country analyses conducted by the World Bank are kept confidential.
Second, the Scorecard examines the WBG’s disclosure systems in order to determine whether the systems (a) uphold the presumption of information disclosure; (b) establish process guarantees for information requests; and (c) allow for an appeals process in the case of requests that have been unreasonably denied.
For example, the Scorecard found, while the policies of the Bank, IFC and MIGA each state a presumption in favor of disclosure, typically
known as a principle of maximum disclosure, this principle is not implemented in practice. Instead, the policies are, in effect, publication schemes which provide a list of information that will be disclosed, while all other information is kept confidential. In this way, the scope of the disclosure policies is limited.
Finally, the Scorecard considers how the right to information is being protected, by evaluating the rules for protecting whistleblowers, the
requirements for regular review of transparency standards, and the procedures in place for the active promotion of openness– through
corporate incentive programs along with dissemination and translation strategies. Although the Bank Group has some positive features of its
whistleblower policy including appropriate burden of proof standards and relief for whistleblowers, there are still several important shortcomings. For instance, the scope of the policy is limited to staff (the WBG’s numerous consultants are not covered); there is no truly
independent forum for adjudication; and there is no record of the institution’s actions to correct and prevent future wrongdoings exposed
through whistleblower disclosure.
Also, it is not clear if and when the WBG conducts staff trainings on the disclosure policy and there is no information on how proper
implementation of openness principles and rules form part of the staff incentive or evaluation procedures. Furthermore, it is unclear whether
sanctions exist for the purposeful violation of the disclosure policy. Finally, while a records management system exist at each arm of the
WBG, only the IFC has clearly indicated that it will track and report on the disclosure of and requests for information.
DETAILS
Published 7th January 2007 by Bank Information Center
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